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Abstract: In interwar Japan the gold standard became conflated with austerity
but, historically, there had been no such connection in Japan. Nineteenth and
twentieth century British rhetoric made the gold standard an adjunct of defla-
tion, but that was a British fixation, not Japanese. In addition to being highly
political, this late-nineteenth century understanding and use of the gold stan-
dard was based on, and promoted, expansionary monetary policy and long-term
development. In the interwar period this changed. Japanese governments chose
austerity under the guise of complying with international rules and standards
and turned the expansionary gold standard of the pre-World War I years into a
deflationary system of austerity, depression, and, ultimately, nationalist
reaction.
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One attribute of the 2008 financial crash and its aftermath has been the policy
prominence, particularly in Europe, of austerity in a recession – despite largely
non-existent empirical and logical support, and underpinned primarily by cul-
tural and character arguments. For historians this is remarkably reminiscent of
the 1920s where policy decisions often made little sense in terms of economics,
but instead rested on self-image, psychology, and an obeisance to contemporary
convention in addition to the perennial division of particular groups seeking
what they viewed as their own self-interest. The arguments then and now are
remarkably consistent, and remarkably consistent in the groups and powers that
they favor and disfavor as well as the results.
In the 1920s, principally in Japan and Britain, and then followed by
Germany after 1929, austerity became associated with serious, responsible pub-
lic policy although in practice it was nothing of the sort. Policy makers focused
on the gold standard – the dominant international currency system from the
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late-nineteenth century to the Great Depression, which had been suspended
during World War I – both as a reason and as a means to promote austerity
and economic recessions. In practice, the gold standard was driven – as the euro
is today – by political, economic, and ideological forces far more complicated
than appeals to economic science or policy inevitability (“there is no other
choice”) imply. So why did and why do countries pursue austerity in response
to economic downturns as occurred in the 1920s and after 2008 in contrast to the
dominant, opposite impulse of the late-nineteenth century and the post-World
War II years? And what, in particular, can Japan in the 1920s tell us about this
process?
Taken to its extreme, interwar enthusiasm for austerity and deflation meant
inducing a depression. In both Japan and Britain it reflected a consensus or
orthodox view, a “gold standard ideology” or “gold standard mentality” that
was a distinct product of the interwar years even as it harkened back to nine-
teenth and eighteenth century theory.1 This gold standard ideology existed
among financial, political, and media figures who took pride in being associated
with what they presented as the respectable and sound views of Wall Street and
the City of London.2 Gold standard ideology, with its emphasis on austerity,
deflation, and ironclad rules, dominated primarily in Britain, Wall Street, among
the Austrian School (though with different emphases than the British version),
and among part of Japanese society.3
The gold standard can seem quaint and distant in hindsight. It should not.
Mechanically, it is little different from the post-World War II Bretton Woods
system, the Asian and Latin American fixed exchange rate systems of the 1990s,
and the European Monetary Union and euro, which to date has functioned less
like a national currency than a gold standard style fixed exchange rate system.
Similarly, what was most problematic about the gold standard in its interwar
existence – an obsession with austerity, deflation, and the financial and ideo-
logical interests of the wealthiest slice of national populations, and the pretense
1 Temin 1989, Fukai 1938: 2. For a discussion of Fukai’s views, see Chô 2001 [1973]. For more on
gold standard ideology, see Yeager 1984.
2 Inoue Junnosuke’s correspondence with J.P. Morgan & Co. in New York is replete with Inoue’s
references to his belief in “sound” (in Inoue’s usage, deflationary) policies.
3 The fixation on preserving the then existing gold standard in Germany in the early 1930s and
France into the mid 1930s rested on bases distinct from the 1920s British gold standard
orthodoxy. The dominant concern was not to disturb the exchange rate that had been estab-
lished with much difficulty in the 1920s. Banque of France officials in the 1920s, including the
monetary economist Charles Rist, were well aware of the dangers of deflation, which they
sought to avoid in setting the exchange rate for France’s return to the gold standard. See, for
example, Rist 1924.
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that this represented impartial science, natural necessity, and moral obligation –
should be nothing new to observers of the present day world economy.
1 Interwar Japan and the gold standard
The interwar Japanese economy – and the global – has largely come to be
defined in terms of the Great Depression and the gold standard, with the latter
becoming linked as the primary factor producing the former.4 The gold standard,
however, did not only exist in the 1920s, but worldwide from the 1890s including
in Japan were it was adopted in 1897. Yet, the two systems – the 1890s and the
1920s – were notably different. Most importantly, the first was expansionary, the
second contractionary – and intentionally so in both cases.
The gold standard was the system of pegging the value of national curren-
cies to gold that came to prominence in the nineteenth century through happen-
stance, war, expansion of the British Empire, and then an array of nationalist
and industrial promotion concerns in the late nineteenth century. The gold
standard evolved historically through three phases, distinct geographically,
politically, and economically. In the first phase, from the 1820s through the
1860s, gold was confined to Britain, Australia, Portugal, Brazil, and Turkey. The
second phase began in 1873 when a newly unified Germany adopted the gold
standard followed de facto by France. Finally, the 1890s saw the gold standard’s
third, and first genuinely global, phase as countries such as Japan pursued gold
currency within the context of a new age defined by protectionism, industrial
promotion, and colonial expansion, as well as lingering concerns from the 1870s
and 1880s about the deflationary effects of appreciating currency. With World
War I all countries eventually suspended gold convertibility, thus making return
to the gold standard a symbol in the 1920s – as much political and psychological
as economic – for returning to the presumed peace and prosperity of the prewar
years: the idea of a lost (and, in large degree, imaginary) belle époque particu-
larly powerful in Europe (struggling to recover from war) and Britain (struggling
to preserve its empire and power politics role in the world).
The change in focus in Japanese economic policy after World War I from the
industrial and military expansion of the 1890s to the contractionary austerity of
the 1920s makes the 1920s idea of returning to the gold standard – kinkaikin or
“lifting the gold embargo” in the language of the age – an oxymoron. Japanese
proponents of returning to the gold standard advocated a nominally similar
4 See, in particular, Eichengreen 1992.
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system to the prewar gold standard, but one that radically changed the nature,
purposes, and effects of that system. The Japanese gold standard retained the
same name, but its focus was new – and this novelty reflected changes both in
Japan and the international environment. In short, the prewar gold standard in
Japan was a primarily national system based on national goals and national
interests. The postwar gold standard in Japan was viewed by its advocates as an
international system, needed not for strictly national purposes or national wel-
fare but, instead, in compliance with international norms and international
institutions over which Japan had little, if any, influence.
The economic and historical debate about the yen’s role in Japan’s interwar
depression and post-1932 recovery has been remarkably uncontroversial. The
decision of Japan’s Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo of the Seiyûkai to leave
the gold standard and let the yen freely depreciate in 1932 has always been part
of what Keynesian era observers argued were anticipatory Keynesian policies in
Japan.5 In line with the shift from Keynesian economics, particularly in the
United States, since the 1970s, economic discussions about Takahashi econom-
ics and Japan’s relatively quick recovery after leaving the gold standard have
instead tended to become centered on how much, if any, influence fiscal
spending under Takahashi had with that recovery.6
Nakamura (1971) has emphasized fiscal stimulus, monetary easing, and yen
depreciation as one combined policy. Nanto and Takagi (1985) and Okura and
Teranishi (1984) emphasize yen depreciation. Cha (2003) focuses on fiscal pol-
icy, which he finds essential, but also emphasizes the positive effects of yen
depreciation. Iida and Okada (2004) emphasize the role of inflationary expecta-
tions stemming from leaving the gold standard and the Bank of Japan’s
announcement of monetary easing. Umeda (2006) emphasizes overseas prices
and the exchange rate. Shizume (2009) argues that the yen depreciation was
notably more important than fiscal policy.
None of these works has disputed at least some effect of the yen’s deprecia-
tion in Japan’s recovery from the Great Depression. Nor is this simply a question
of hindsight. When Japan went back onto the gold standard in early 1930 – after
the 1929 Wall Street crash – the chosen exchange rate was universally accepted
5 Smethurst 2007 follows in this tradition.
6 A central aim of the attack on Keynesianism – and return to nineteenth century English
theory – being to show that government spending (fiscal policy) is ineffective and that eco-
nomic policy should focus on monetary policy (through independent central banks) as well as
shifting from promoting demand through direct payments to individuals to promoting supply
through aid to companies (cutting taxes, regulations, labor laws).
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in Japan as being overvalued and requiring significant deflation to enact and
sustain.
But beyond purely technical issues, Japan’s two gold standards – prewar
and interwar – reflect broader alternation between expansionary and contrac-
tionary economic policy and the political parties and social groups promoting
and benefiting under one or the other system. As Mark Metzler discusses,
Japan’s modern political parties developed as part of an alternation between
expansionary and contractionary economic policy.7 Specifically, the Seiyûkai
and its supports favored an expansionist “positive” or “active” policy (sekkyoku
seisaku 積極政策) reminiscent of post-World War II Keynesianism while the
Kenseikai and its successor Minseitô focused on austerity: fiscal and monetary
retrenchment (“negative” or passive policy (shōkyoku seisaku 消極政策)). One
can see a similar distinction today between the Liberal Democratic Party’s more
expansionist abenomics and the budget balancing emphasis of the Minshutô
(DPJ) – with both parties across the board roughly matching bases of support
and policy inclinations with those of the Seiyûkai and Minseitô.
In rough trajectory with the ascendency of one or the other party and the
interests they represented (farmers, banks, debtors, creditors, export industry,
import industry, great power wars, colonial expansion, treaty diplomacy) eco-
nomic policy shifted between expansion and contraction with an expansionary
wartime and postwar boom from 1904 through 1906, retrenchment from 1907 to
1915, renewed expansion from 1916 to 1920, on and off contraction through the
1920s in anticipation of “returning” to the gold standard, contraction and
austerity from 1929 through 1931 as the gold standard was reintroduced at the
prewar exchange rate, and then expansion as the yen was allowed to float freely
from 1932 – which was, in turn, made more expansionary by increased govern-
ment development expenditures (fiscal policy) and then increased military
expenditures especially from the mid-1930s.8
In the 1920s the Seiyûkai’s expansionary policy was embodied by Takahashi
Korekiyo, who served first as Governor of the Bank of Japan and then, repeat-
edly, as Finance Minister. Kenseikai/Minseitô austerity became associated with
Wakatsuki Reijirô, Hamaguchi Osachi, and Inoue Junnosuke. Wakatsuki and
Hamaguchi were career officials in the Finance Ministry before joining the
Kenseikai/Minseitô and serving as Finance Minister, Home Minister, party pre-
sident, and Prime Minister. Inoue started at the Bank of Japan and served as
7 Metzler 2015.
8 Although fiscal policy, military expenditures tend to be excluded from fiscal policy discus-
sions and standard budgeting concerns in countries assigning heavy political and/or ideologi-
cal weight to the military and military action.
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Governor of the Bank of Japan before becoming Finance Minister and then
Minseitô president.
In addition to expansion versus contraction (austerity) the prewar and
interwar Japanese gold standards also differed in terms of nationalism versus
internationalism (or an ostensible internationalism of implicit national Anglo-
American dominance) and the interwar’s adoption of other elements of the
British theoretical heritage common from the 1980s onwards as well: rules rather
than discretion, and free trade rather than protectionism.9 As part of this rules-
based (and, in practice, contractionary) thinking the gold standard was pre-
sented as a straightjacket restraining governments, rather than a discretionary
tool to be used by governments for national ends as in the prewar period.10
Britain in the final years before World War I came closest to this fictional view.
But as economists and historians such as Barry Eichengreen and Arthur
Bloomfield have shown, even Britain was not immune from fiddling with the
rules and intervening in exchange markets in the late-nineteenth century.11
As much as the gold standard was an international monetary institution
establishing a common global reference for international trade and finance, it
was also originally an explicitly national institution and flowed out of efforts in
the nineteenth century to create national currencies. Under centralized govern-
ment control, these currencies replaced the more flexible and borderless curren-
cies of the pre-nineteenth-century world such as Mexican silver, which had
dominated in Asian trade.12 Most notably, governments established central
banks simultaneously with expansion of the gold standard.13 They used these
banks to control financial flows, which under English liberal theory were sup-
posed to occur automatically and free from state control. The State Bank of
Russia (1860), the German Reichsbank (1876), the Austro-Hungarian Bank
(1877), the Bank of Japan (1882), and the Bank of Italy (1893) – all were part of
9 In practice, despite the clarity of ideological rhetoric no country was ever fully rules-based or
fully discretionary, fully free trade or full protectionist. And, often, such as in mid-nineteenth-
century Britain the tools of one (free trade) could be used for the ends of the other
(protectionism).
10 1920s style rules ideas gained prominence again starting in the 1970s in reaction to discre-
tionary Keynesianism dominant from the 1930s through the early 1970s. For this renascent rules
literature, see Kydland/Prescott 1977, Lucas 1976, and Barro/Gordon 1983. For rules interpreta-
tions of the gold standard, see Bordo/Rockoff 1996, Bordo/MacDonald 1997, Bordo/Kydland
1995, 1996, and Bordo et al. 1999.
11 Eichengreen 1987, 1992, Bloomfield 1959, 1963.
12 For the nationalization of currency in the nineteenth century, see Helleiner 2003. On Asian
currencies, see Wolters 2005.
13 On the relationship between central banks, the gold standard, economic nationalism, and
activist state policy, see De Cecco 1974, Helleiner 2002, 2003.
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the process of monetary consolidation and control that continued with adoption
of the gold standard.14
In many respects the situation in Japan in the 1920s was similar to that in
Britain, where policymakers spent a decade deflating the economy for the sake
of returning to the gold standard at the prewar exchange rate (or ‘par’ or
‘parity’), with severe effects on industry and employment. In Britain, old par
enthusiasts based their beliefs on the interests of debt holders and recapturing
prewar British financial and political pre-eminence. The latter, they believed,
with little evidence, rested on returning to the gold standard at the prewar
exchange rate.
In Japan, however, old par enthusiasts were not looking to recapture lost
influence. On the contrary, Japan’s political and economic position strengthened
as a result of World War I. Heavily indebted at the start of the war, by 1919 Japan
had turned from a net debtor to net creditor and its economy was in the midst of
new and heavy industrialization. Instead, old par enthusiasts in Japan saw
austerity and deflation both as ends unto themselves and as means to return
to what they viewed as Japan’s true economy after the ‘false’ years of the
wartime and post-war boom.
2 Currency appreciation, deflation, panics, and
depression
The causal relationship between currency appreciation, deflation (or disinfla-
tion), and, in the extreme, recession and depression is a standard part of
economic theory. Appreciating currency does not always mean deflation just
as depreciating currency does not always mean inflation – and in non-extreme
amounts and depending on the circumstances may be beneficial. But the general
logic – and dominant logic of the post-World War II years – is that policy should
act counter-cyclically to expand the economy in recessions and dampen demand
if inflation becomes too great. Less logically consistent is the reverse course of
contracting the economy when inflation is not excessive or when the economy is
already in recession – in effect, the logic of 1920s (or 2010s) austerity.
14 Central banks were expected to work with the government (or were part of the government)
and in many cases (such as the Bank of France) in part funded the government. The imple-
mentation of independent central banks is part of the anti-Keynesian, neoclassical turn from the
1970s and geared, primarily, to promoting low inflation rather than employment.
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In interwar Japan the connection between yen appreciation and deflation
stands out. Looked at over the course of the 1920s, the yen’s appreciation was
consistently followed, with a delay, by price declines. New par advocates were
particularly concerned that the deflation rate was larger than the rate of yen
appreciation. That is, there was a multiplier effect: a given amount of apprecia-
tion produced an even greater amount of deflation. From 1924 through 1928 the
yen appreciated 13.5 per cent against the dollar, while prices declined 17 per-
cent.15 From 1925 through 1928 the yen appreciated 11.6 per cent while prices fell
by 17 per cent.
The yen’s appreciation also correlated with Japan’s repeated financial
panics of the 1920s. The pattern was consistent: austerity and appreciation to
return close to the prewar par, panic, retreat from austerity, compensatory
measures from the Bank of Japan and/or government, followed by depreciation.
And then the cycle would commence again. Far from financial panics being a
deus ex machina interrupting an otherwise smooth appreciation of the yen, as
portrayed by old par advocates particularly outside of Japan, appreciation itself
was a major factor behind Japan’s financial panics, including the largest of them
in 1927.
In this way arguments that ‘if only x, y or z had not happened in the 1920s,
Japan would have smoothly returned to the gold standard’ miss the point that x,
y and z were almost always tied to attempts to return to the gold standard at the
prewar par. Although the yen’s appreciation from 1925 onwards was not the only
factor in bringing about the 1927 financial panic, the Kenseikai/Wakatsuki
cabinet’s moves toward lifting the gold embargo at the prewar parity were the
most fundamental cause, with the key factor being deflation from and for
currency appreciation.16 As appreciation and deflation continued exports and
economic activity decreased and debt burdens and bankruptcies increased.17
The logical alternative was to lift the gold embargo immediately but at a
devalued exchange rate. As of 1929, however, when the return to the gold
standard was finally decided, that was still a minority opinion.
There was nothing to prevent a government from reactivating the gold
standard at an exchange rate different from that used prior to World War I. In
Japan the prewar exchange rate of 1 yen to US$49.85 had been in effect for
eighteen years.18 There was no particular sense in assuming that an exchange
15 Tôyô keizai shinpô 4/1929: 12.
16 Tôyô keizai shinpô 4/1929: 13.
17 Developed most famously by Fisher 1933, debt deflation is a standard concept in economic
literature that discusses how deflation increases the real amount of money that debtors owe.
18 Suzuki 1929: 49.
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rate roughly reflecting the state of the economy, and its position relative to other
countries, in 1897 should be the same eighteen years later given continual
changes in trade, growth, population, and industry. In addition there were the
enormous changes brought by World War I: an export and industrial boom,
financial speculation, inflation, post-war agricultural surpluses and price
declines, speculative bubbles, and a fundamentally reordered Japanese and
world economy.
One possibility was to lower the official parity to the most recent market
exchange rate – which for Japan in early 1929, the year the Minseitô government
forced through return to the gold standard, would have been approximately
US$45.19 This was essentially what France, Italy, and Germany had done. In this
way the exchange rate could be stabilized without changing relations between
debtors and creditors and without causing real tax burdens to increase. Fixed
exchange rates would provide a stable base for businesses to budget costs and
revenues. Businesses could then invest and trade without fear of losses from
fluctuating exchange rates.
But for Inoue Junnosuke, a product of the international banking community
and notably anglophile, forcing through return to the gold standard at the
prewar exchange rate represented both the fulfillment of the Minseitô’s main
economic plank and emulation of Britain’s return to the gold standard. Inoue,
though, was hardly a lifelong advocate of deflation. Inoue was a vocal advocate
for returning to the gold standard at the prewar exchange rate throughout the
1920s. But as Governor of the Bank of Japan and during his first term as Finance
Minister, Inoue had a reputation for being financially practical and not particu-
larly ideological. During the post-panic, 1927 currency appreciation the Bank of
Japan – with Inoue as Governor – lowered interest rates expressly to prevent
deflation.20
Upon returning as Finance Minister in 1929, however, Inoue insisted on
immediately reinstating the gold standard at the prewar par. Though generally
regarded in the U.S. and Britain as liberal due to his support for the gold
standard and close relations with Wall Street and the City of London, Inoue
was not above using the Tokyo police to intimidate those he viewed as under-
mining the gold standard by selling yen and purchasing dollars. Inoue made
deflation a national mass movement from mid-1929 with anti-consumption
campaigns, police suasion, and public denunciations of trading firms choosing
to purchase dollars rather than yen. The day before the gold standard went into
effect on January 11, 1930, the Finance and Interior Ministries had the main
19 Uenoyama 1/1929: 16.
20 Tôyô keizai shinpô 4/1929: 12.
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Tokyo stock and currency traders called into police headquarters for a lecture on
their duties to support Japanese financial markets.21 Inoue also joined national-
ist groups in their public denunciations of Japanese currency traders buying
dollars as being un-patriotic.
In addition to Inoue, advocates for reinstating the prewar exchange rate fell
into four general categories. First were deflation enthusiasts who argued for the
ostensibly competitive benefits of deflation, ‘liquidation’ (seiri), and ‘rationaliza-
tion’ (gôrika). For them the boom years of World War I were not a benefit, but a
curse because industries had been coddled as if in a “greenhouse” and their
success represented a “false balance sheet” that could only be “true” if sub-
jected to the prewar exchange rate.22 Closely connected with these, and in many
cases overlapping, were economic moralists who claimed that saving, suffering,
and retrenchment reflected and promoted national and individual character.
Third were those who viewed the exchange rate as symbolic of national worth.
Even the otherwise skeptical Vice Governor of the Bank of Japan Fukai Eigo
argued that it would be useful to adopt the prewar exchange rate in order to
avoid the damage to Japanese self-esteem in being associated with the devalu-
ing countries of Germany, France, and Italy.23 The main Tokyo and Osaka
newspapers, in particular, stressed the loss of national honor that would result
from failure to return to the gold standard at the prewar exchange rate. For them
devaluing the currency was tantamount to devaluing national status.
3 The Kinkaikin problem
Occasionally viewed as a decade of deflation, stagnation, and economic distress,
the Japanese economy in the 1920s consisted of wildly differing sectors. Some
were stagnant, others expanding. GDP growth, except when compared with the
exceptionally high rates of World War I and equally pronounced growth after
1932, was hardly anemic.
Deflation was not a serious problem until governments from the mid-1920s
adopted it as official policy. From 1926, first under the Kenseikai Finance
Minister Naoharu Kataoka, and then more intermittently under the Seiyûkai
Finance Minister Mitsuchi Chûzô, governments began preparing for a return to
21 Tôyô keizai shinpô 1/18/1930; Tôyô keizai shinpô 1/25/1930: 7. On frugality campaigns, see
Metzler 2004 and 2006, and Garon 1997 and 1998.
22 Morita 1929: 67, 69.
23 Uenoyama 3/1929: 47.
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the gold standard at the prewar exchange rate. But in Japan the enthusiasm
for austerity and deflation most notable in the Kenseikai and Minseitô came
unaccompanied by the vague longing for glories past that drove Britain’s
return to its overvalued, prewar exchange rate. Even with Japan’s postwar
bubble having burst in 1920, Japan’s economy in the early 1920s was funda-
mentally stronger commercially, industrially, and financially than in the
years before World War I. Rather, the impetus for returning to the prewar
exchange rate in Japan came primarily from Japan’s largest banks and other
financial institutions, urban political parties most closely tied with these
institutions, and the daily press.
Old par advocates in the interwar years, in their emphasis on a supposed
immutable value of gold across the war years, neglected that gold prices fluc-
tuated significantly during the nineteenth century. They also neglected that
worldwide expansion in the 1890s and early 1900s was in large part a monetary
phenomenon linked to increased gold production.24 In the 1890s as countries
worldwide moved to the gold standard, that standard had become inflationary
rather than deflationary in marked contrast to the gold-standard-linked deflation
of the previous twenty years.25
In the early 1880s Japanese governments induced deflation to deal with
rampant inflation from the late 1870s.26 But there was a difference between
prices in 1870s Japan and 1920s Japan. Japanese prices declined from 1925
even prior to the Minseitô’s deflation campaigns.27 At the end of December
1924 the wholesale price index was 229. By March 1929 it had dropped to
178.28 By 1929 there had been four years of moderate deflation, particularly
felt in Japan’s agricultural villages. Prices were largely stable since mid-1928.
Inducing more deflation in order to reach the prewar exchange rate meant
destabilizing the economy rather than stabilizing it.
But despite continuing deflation the Kenseikai/Minseitô, banks, and the
daily press talked much about the need for “liquidation” (seiri) and “austerity”
(kinshuku). By the late 1920s it had become a standard trope in which the
presumed need for “liquidation” and “austerity” were invoked without explain-
ing why they were necessary beyond a presumed need to return to the gold
standard at the prewar exchange rate. It was never explained why the gold
24 Uenoyama 3/1929.
25 For how gold’s turn to being an expansionary standard encouraged states to adopt the gold
standard, see Flandreau et al. 1998.
26 See Ericson 2014.
27 Tôyô keizai shinpô 5/1929: 10.
28 Tôyô keizai shinpô 5/1929: 10.
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standard had to be reactivated at the prewar exchange rate except for those,
going full circle, who claimed it was to promote liquidation and austerity.
To the extent that returning to the prewar exchange rate was justified as a
prerequisite to contraction and austerity, the argument became circular.
Contraction and austerity were needed to return to the prewar exchange rate,
which was needed in order to promote contraction and austerity. The same
rhetorical slight of hand functioned in simultaneously arguing that the gold
embargo could be lifted at the prewar exchange rate because contraction and
austerity had been completed and then advocating a vast campaign of contrac-
tion and austerity in order to support the newly installed gold standard.
Contraction and austerity were interchangeably used as prerequisites,
duties, rationales, means, and ends in a series of arguments that never ulti-
mately answered why contraction and austerity were beneficial or necessary. As
the journal Tôyô keizai shinpô remarked, the words liquidation and austerity
were “invoked as if chanting a prayer” but never explained or justified.29
4 The expansionary prewar
The gold standard that Japanese supporters in the 1920s claimed they were
reintroducing was not the same gold standard that Japan had enacted in 1897.
There were significant differences between how the gold standard functioned –
and what motivated it – in Japan prior to World War I and how its advocates in
the 1920s believed or claimed.
Despite concerns about a deflationary gold standard, the gold standard did
not need to be deflationary. In Meiji Japan currency rates were accepted as tools
to other ends. No one with any influence in Meiji Japan argued that currency had
an innate, natural value that existed outside the control of governments and that
could only be expressed in terms of gold. In this view, any governmental
attempt to alter the exchange rate from an exact substitute of one unit of
paper to one unit of gold was both against nature and an illegitimate exercise
of governmental power. Since none of these nature-of-money arguments carried
weight in Meiji Japan, setting the exchange rate became a practical matter of
weighing the costs and benefits of potential rates. This meant in practice decid-
ing whether the exchange rate would be at the still legally existing rate from the
prior 1871 Currency Law or whether the gold rate would be devalued to com-
pensate for two and a half decades of falling silver prices relative to gold.
29 Tôyô keizai shinpô 5/1929: 10.
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If one adopted the dominant view taken in the 1920s that the pre-existing
exchange rate was sacrosanct, the answer would be to keep the 1871 rate and
induce a depression in order to force the economy to deflate to the old exchange
rate. Why someone would want to do this was another question entirely. But
unlike in the years after World War I, the most recent point of reference for
governments in the 1890s was the deflation of the 1880s, not inflation. Japanese
governments in the 1890s were more concerned with promoting industrial
expansion than they were with the cult of induced deflation that developed
around the gold standard after World War I.
A state orientation toward industry and economic expansion did not mean
that devaluation was a given. There existed a range of opinions regarding the
specific exchange rate that could be set. Debtors, creditors, farmers, different
industries, exporters, importers, banks, and various journalists, politicians and
bureaucrats representing one or more of these groups all had their preferences
for the exchange rate.
The Finance Minister Matsukata Masayoshi ultimately devalued the gold
exchange rate in Article 2 of the Currency Law fifty per cent from what it had
been under the 1871 currency law.30 The 1 gold equals 32.3 silver rate that
Matsukata established in the Currency Law was meant to reflect the existing
1:28 Japanese market rate – as opposed to the 1:16 rate in the 1871 law – thereby
leaving the price level and debt relations unchanged, plus an extra margin to
allow for potential silver depreciation in the future.
Above all, Matsukata emphasized the need to avoid larger economic and
social changes as a result of currency changes. The point was to avoid unne-
cessary shocks to the economy and to prevent changes in the relative economic
positions of different groups merely through currency changes.
5 The contractionary postwar
Suspension of the gold standard worldwide with World War I led to a significant
increase in Japan’s overseas gold reserves. By the late 1920s, however, as these
reserves dwindled there developed an exaggerated sense of time pressure to do
something about returning to the gold standard.
Once the yen’s value began plummeting from 1921 arguments emerged that
the Japanese price level was too high compared with the rest of the world. The
30 See Matsukata’s March 3, 1897 Diet speech where he explains how the specific exchange
rate was calculated. Matsukata 1899.
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argument was, essentially, that an import surplus meant prices were too high
and only by lifting the gold embargo could those import surpluses be erased.
But the argument, even on the most abstract level, only made sense if one
accepted eighteenth century theory about the automatic workings of the gold
standard as an actual description of reality. Regardless of the price level, Japan
needed to import large amounts of materials unavailable in Japan to rebuild
after the 1923 Tokyo earthquake. Nor had the nineteenth century gold standard
ever meant, except in theory, that countries on a gold standard had perfectly
balanced trade and did not chronically run import surpluses as Japan had in fact
done prior to World War I.
But even if this presumed automaticity of the gold standard were the goal,
the particular price level at which one adopted, or reactivated, the gold standard
made no difference. If one did not particularly care about lifting the gold
embargo at the prewar exchange rate, the issue became one of devaluing the
exchange rate to accommodate the actual price level. Absent hyperinflation that
carried costs entirely separate from the trade balance, there was no practical
reason to assume that the price level was a problem or that the price level
should necessarily change rather than the exchange rate.
A great many people, including academics, editorial writers, bankers, poli-
ticians and bureaucrats cared about lifting the gold embargo at the prewar
exchange rate even if they did not present a rationale for that exchange rate
beyond assuming that deflation in and of itself enhanced “competitiveness”
(kyôsôryoku). As with so much else in the austerity debates of the 1920s the
idea of competitiveness – and its vague and generalized use – forms a central
part of the present day euro debate as well. If one, however, accepted that
Japanese prices were higher than those in the United States or Britain (though
less than those in France and Germany) and that this was somehow a problem,
there were three methods advanced to push Japanese prices down.
First, one could lift the gold embargo according to the classic eighteenth
century, David Hume, specie flow mechanism argument that gold would imme-
diately flow out forcing the domestic price level down to its presumed natural
level consistent with the prewar par. In theory as well as practice, however, this
meant prompting a recession and very likely a financial crisis as well. If one
wanted gold standard orthodoxy, then this was the logical option.
But even the most die-hard advocates of the prewar exchange rate did not
take Hume’s theory to its logical conclusion that, merely by lifting the gold
embargo at the old exchange rate, prices would quickly and efficiently ratchet
downwards. Instead, supporters emphasized the need to push the price level
down before lifting the gold embargo. Yet they most often did so simultaneously
with the argument that lifting the gold embargo itself would push prices down,
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mixing the two issues and effectively proposing two measures that risked
circulating about each other until each became a prerequisite for the other.
This contradictory, before-after, condition-consequence mix of deflation
arguments gave an otherworldly quality to the debate. On the one hand, old
par proponents argued that the time was ripe for lifting the gold embargo, and it
could be accomplished with minimal pain, because the price level had already
dropped. On the other hand they also argued that upon lifting the gold embargo
mass mobilization efforts would be necessary to force down the very same prices
that had ostensibly already declined in order to sustain the gold standard.
The second way to reduce prices relative to those of other countries was the
exact opposite of returning to the overvalued rate and letting the real economy
adjust. Instead, one could allow no payments in gold whatsoever: no gold
exports and no payment from overseas gold reserves. Instead, the exchange
rate would fall where it would. Price competitiveness would be obtained not
through austerity, but through allowing the exchange rate to depreciate to
whatever level it would without state intervention. This would lower relative
export prices and feed an export boom as during the war. Inukai Tsuyoshi’s
Seiyûkai cabinet under Minister of Finance Takahashi Korekiyo followed this
option from December 1931 in going off the gold standard. The resulting yen
depreciation and export boom – with or without public works and military
expenditures – is generally seen as pulling Japan out of its gold standard
induced depression.31
The third possibility advanced at the time was to worry about both
domestic and export prices and simultaneously try to inflate and deflate the
economy. That is, allow no gold exports or drawing down of specie reserves
as Takahashi Korekiyo pursued after 1931 in order to devalue the exchange
rate and spur exports while, simultaneously, reducing the money supply
domestically in mimicry of government policy of the early 1880s. This third
possibility is, in essence, what is now called “expansionary austerity” and is
similar to what was supposedly followed in Sweden and Canada in the 1990s:
i.e., combine domestic austerity with currency deprecation and expanded
exports. The key historical and empirical point, though, is that austerity is
only expansionary if accompanied by currency devaluation. Without devalua-
tion, austerity is simply austerity.32
31 See Nakamura 1971, Nanto/Takagi 1985, Okura/Teranishi 1994, Cha 2003, Iida/Okada 2004,
Umeda 2006, and Shizume 2009.
32 On expansionary and non-expansionary austerity see Gavazzi and Pagano 1990, Alesina/
Ardagna 1998, 2009, Guajardo et al. 2011, International Monetary Fund 2012, and Blanchard/
Leigh 2013.
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Prior to the end of 1931, however, neither the Seiyûkai nor Kenseikai/
Minseitô cabinets clearly chose any of these options. Even Inoue Junnosuke’s
rushed move to lift the gold embargo in 1929 was a stopgap affair wherein Inoue
swung wildly between trumpeting “natural” market mechanisms and seeking
state control over those same forces when the outcomes did not match what he
had imagined. The natural market mechanisms – i.e., the movements of the yen
absent state efforts to control the yen’s value – of 1920s Japan were for the yen to
depreciate, not appreciate as Inoue and the Kenseikai/Minseitô wanted. The
Seiyûkai, meanwhile, preferred to fudge the issue in an attempt to save gold
reserves for use in China.33
There was also among the Kenseikai/Minseitô the idea that political inter-
nationalism would save economic internationalism. In this view, the
Washington Conference System – the core of the Kenseikai’s policy of
“Shidehara Diplomacy” – would establish a world standard not only for military
reductions, but also for global currency policy.34 Whereas the Seiyûkai declined
to lift the gold embargo in 1919 out of a desire to pursue its own foreign policy
and economic objectives in China, the Kenseikai/Minseitô were paralyzed by
their reliance on Anglo-American institutions and agreements. This reliance
became an excuse for inaction until Inoue frantically moved to return to the
gold standard at the prewar exchange rate in late 1929 just as the New York
Stock Exchange collapsed.
The second, and simplest and easiest, option – letting the exchange rate
depreciate – carried the least weight for reasons that, if ever expressed, were
more psychological than economic or empirical. For proponents of the prewar
exchange rate, depreciation was to be avoided precisely because it was the
simplest and easiest option – implying assumed moral failure, lack of character
or loss of international prestige. For example, the Bank of Japan’s Vice Governor
Fukai Eigo argued that devaluation would damage Japanese self-esteem since
Japan would then be analogous to France and Italy rather than Britain and the
United States who did not.35 For old par advocates, failing to make the effort
necessary to return to the prewar exchange rate indicated a character weakness
and inability to endure hardship that would turn Japanese society into a nation
of weaklings. In this view devaluation “results in people running away, avoiding
all difficulty and easily giving up.” This, in turn, was a problem of “modern
social conditions” that were “ever speeding up” and “ever more shallow.”36
33 On plans for a yen bloc including China, see Schiltz 2012.
34 Ishibashi 1929: 23.
35 Uenoyama 3/1929: 47.
36 Obama 1929: 63.
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This refusal to let the exchange rate depreciate resulted from 1925 onwards
in the government consistently paying down its remaining overseas reserves in
order to prop up the yen as close to the prewar exchange rate as possible. The
Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan could still replenish these overseas
reserves even with the post-1920 trade deficits – and partially did so earlier in
the 1920s – through foreign loans. But this inevitably pushed the question of the
gold standard’s suspension to the fore and, by 1929 when the reserves where
virtually exhausted, almost inevitably meant dealing definitively one way or
another with lifting the gold embargo and the entire issue of the gold standard –
the “kinkaikin problem”.
By 1929 the declining state of overseas reserves, if not an insurmountable
technical problem – as they could be refilled although with various economic
permutations and consequences – was, however, a looming political issue and
came to be viewed, reasonably or not, as a ticking clock setting a limit on the
time available to reinstitute the gold standard.37
6 Kinkaikin problematizers
Returning to the gold standard became a problem in the 1920s because people
made it a problem – and they made it a problem through austerity. There were
reasons to want to stabilize the exchange rate through fixed exchange rates and
an international currency system. But from the mid-1920s the desire for stability
was replaced as the driving force of returning to the gold standard by a desire to
reinstate the prewar exchange rate for the sake of reinstating the prewar
exchange rate and an almost obsessive desire to throw the economy into a
depression.
For many of the most enthusiastic proponents of returning to the gold
standard at the prewar exchange rate, reactivating the gold standard was not
the end goal itself. It was, instead, a means to austerity and contraction.
Reinstating the gold standard by the late 1920s in Japan became a means for
those who wished to deflate the economy in pursuit of “liquidation,” “austerity,”
and the “competitiveness” this was supposed to produce, as a means to
strengthen national character or in simple adherence with the supposed inter-
national “rules of the game.” For the most influential supporters of the prewar
exchange rate, deflation was not a side effect of returning to the gold standard.
It was the purpose.
37 Ishibashi 1930: 21.
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The divisions over the gold standard were not, however, along left-right
lines. Rather, there were two sets of divisions – practical versus theoretical (with
the inevitable blurring between the two: one’s pragmatism is another’s ideology;
pragmatism itself is an ideology), and interest group divisions. As seen by
Akamatsu Katsumaro of the Social Democratic Party (Shakai Minshûtô) the
situation was little different from that as seen by the more classically liberal
Ishibashi Tanzan of the Tôyô keizai shinpô, his more critical colleague Takahashi
Kamekichi or almost any industrialist, including Mutô Sanji of the textile firm
(and export dependent) Kanebo.
Doctrinal Marxists agreed that deflation and returning to the gold standard
at the prewar exchange rate would be disastrous. But, like deflation proponents
who welcomed the coming competitive effects of depression, they too welcomed
the coming disaster. For Japanese Marxists who believed the destruction of
capitalism was both inevitable and desirable, lifting the gold embargo at the
prewar parity meant little but a “contradiction of capitalism”: a self-defeating
course that would speed the destruction of capitalism. Much as Marx had
announced his support for free trade in the mid-nineteenth century believing it
would speed capitalism’s end, Japanese Marxists in the 1920s looked forward to
returning to the gold standard at the prewar exchange rate as proof of the futility
of the capitalist system.38
Supporters of the prewar exchange rate saw things differently. The first
point of the austerity/prewar exchange rate triangle was the banking industry.
Bankers generally favored immediately lifting the gold embargo at the prewar
exchange rate because it increased the value of their loans and yen-based
assets, and increased their purchasing power overseas. But Japan’s banks
balked when the inevitable depression threatened their own interests.
Repeatedly during the 1920s, the main Tokyo banks called for immediate return
to the gold standard and then pulled back when moves to do so led to interest
rate increases, stock and bond collapses, and financial panics. Japan’s banks
wanted to return to the gold standard at the prewar par until governments
actually began moving in that direction. The banking industry would either
then retreat from the idea of immediately returning to the gold standard or
would demand financial assistance that made returning to the prewar exchange
rate essentially meaningless.
Representatives of industry, particularly the silk and textile industry, sup-
ported reinstating the gold standard at the prewar exchange rate in order to
stabilize exchange rates and promote exports in the early 1920s. They shifted,
however, to fierce opposition in the late 1920s when it had become apparent that
38 Akamatsu 1929: 48. Marx 1848.
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the prewar exchange rate would damage exports, raise interest rates, and
produce a depression. Mutô Sanji of Kanebo, Kagami Kenkichi of Tokyo
Marine Insurance, and Yano Kota of Daiichi Life Insurance all supported deva-
luing the exchange rate by 1929. Nowhere was the change in opinion more
pronounced than with Mutô who shifted from being a strong supporter of
immediate return to the prewar exchange rate in 1924 to equally strongly
supporting devaluation in 1929.39
Japan’s new industries established during the war – and benefiting under
depreciated exchange rates – also fiercely opposed returning to the prewar
exchange rate. With World War I there had been a burst of new businesses
and expansion of old: iron, steel, machinery, leather, chemical fertilizers, dyes,
glass, paper, and various chemical industries.40 Except for paper manufactur-
ing, all were infant industries and had largely developed since the gold standard
was suspended in 1917 due to the natural protection provided the depreciating
exchange rate. This mirrored development of the textile industry in the 1890s,
which benefited from depreciating silver and then was further protected by
Matsukata’s devalued exchange rate in the 1897 Currency Law.
At the end of 1928 the Industry Club of Japan (Nihon kôgyô kurabu) issued a
report estimating the effects of lifting the gold embargo at the prewar par on
various industries. It showed major losses for all industries. The report estimated
particularly large losses for the iron/steel, chemical fertilizer, and electrical
machine industries.41 Except for internal industry reports, however, there was
little study – by Inoue, the Minseitô, the Bank of Japan or the daily newspapers –
of the effects on industry of reinstating the prewar exchange rate. In contrast to
the debate on the gold standard in the 1890s – where the focus was on industry,
commerce, and exports – in the 1920s the center of the gold standard debate
shifted to banking and financial interests and largely ignored industry.
The second point of the triangle advocating deflation and the prewar
exchange rate was the major daily press. The Osaka Mainichi, Osaka Asahi,
Tôkyô Nichinichi, and Tôkyô Asahi were the most enthusiastic in favor of the
prewar exchange rate. The largest dailies – Osaka Asahi with 1.26 million read-
ers, Osaka Mainichi with 1.16 million, Tôkyô Nichinichi 450,000, Tôkyô Asahi
400,000 – were all enthusiastic supporters of deflation.42
In contrast to the largest dailies, the Tôyô keizai shinpô, its editor Ishibashi
Tanzan, and the economic journalist Takahashi Kamekichi were the most
39 Tôyô keizai shinpô 2/1929: 9.
40 Obama 1929: 62.
41 Obama 1929: 62.
42 For circulation figures, see Yamamoto 1981.
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persistent in arguing for devaluation. By 1929 Obama Toshie of the Chugai
Shôgyô Shinpô and Yamazaki Yasuzumi of the Yomiuri Shinbun also joined
calls for devaluing the exchange rate. Far from being a gold standard opponent,
Ishibashi Tanzan was an outspoken supporter of Matsukata’s gold standard and
fiercely critical of then Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo for not lifting the
gold embargo in 1919 at the prewar exchange rate. Contrary to Matsukata in the
1890s, Ishibashi was fundamentally a proponent of English political economy,
but this did not change his support for devaluation by the late 1920s.
Ishibashi regretted that Inoue Junnosuke and others had become obsessed
with reinstating the form of Matsukata’s gold standard rather than the spirit. He
regretted that they insisted on ignoring the changed economic circumstances
between 1899 and 1929. In particular, he objected to their fixating on the
particular exchange rate contained in Matsukata’s Currency Law rather than
the idea underlying it – setting an exchange rate reflecting existing economic
conditions.43 For Ishibashi, Matsukata’s success in adopting the gold standard
was two-fold: adopting the prevailing world standard, and then tailoring it to
Japanese needs – the classic Meiji strategy. Matsukata took the form of prevail-
ing international rules, but then adopted them to Japanese conditions: rules plus
discretion, not rules rather than discretion.
The final, and most important, point of the triangle was the Mitsubishi-
financed Kenseikai and then Minseitô, with their urban, financial industry base.
As discussed above, the Kenseikai/Minseitô Finance Minister Inoue Junnosuke
personified the gold standard as deflation approach in interwar Japan. Most
striking was Inoue’s personal investment in the issue from 1929 onwards. Even
as Britain abandoned the gold standard in September 1931, and Japanese sol-
diers rebelled simultaneously in Manchuria, Inoue refused to reconsider return-
ing to the gold standard at the old exchange rate. Even as the economy quickly
recovered under a depreciated yen from December 1931 Inoue remained a fierce
critic of this abandonment of austerity until his assassination two months later
by nationalists accusing him and a list of other austerity-era politicians and
wealthy bank and corporate heads of selling out Japan, economically and
politically, to foreign interests.
Chô Yukio and Richard Smethurst have argued that Inoue by 1929 was
driven in part by ego and desire to become Prime Minister in a Minseitô
cabinet.44 Mark Metzler is more forgiving, seeing Inoue as sincere in his belief
in austerity and contraction.45 Metzler also cites pressure from U.S. bankers to
43 Ishibashi 1930: 16.
44 Chô 2001 [1973]: 79–82, Smethurst 2007.
45 Metzler 2002, 2006.
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return to the gold standard at the prewar par. Although true that U.S. bankers
often pushed Japan to return to the gold standard at the old par, by 1929 they
were alternately praising Inoue’s retrenchment policies and recommending,
tolerating, and/or leaving the decision regarding devaluation for the Minseitô
government to decide.46
The economics were not mysterious. Devaluation, in addition to being at the
heart of Japan’s adoption of the gold standard prior to World War I, was
followed by any number of countries in the interwar period, including
Germany and most successfully France. By the time Inoue’s old par gold stan-
dard commenced in January 1930, it was already common knowledge in Japan
and elsewhere that Britain’s return to the gold standard at the old par in 1925
had been a mistake and France’s 1928 devaluation successful. France would
only suffer when it insisted on keeping its gold standard (and thus, by then,
overvalued currency) through the mid-1930s as other states abandoned the gold
standard and let their currencies depreciate.47 Other opinions existed, but they
did not change Inoue’s move to reinstate the gold standard at the prewar
exchange rate.
7 Conclusion
Japan’s return to the gold standard implicated two interrelated problems. The
first was the insistence on inducing deflation and economic depression for the
sake of returning to the gold standard at the prewar exchange rate, and the
simultaneous use of the gold standard as an excuse for independently desired
austerity. The second problem was governmental policy that sought affirmation
overseas and among a small subsection of the most well off members of
46 Thomas Lamont papers, Harvard Business School Library. See J.P. Morgan internal memo
dated June 7, 1929 in which Morgan Partner Lamont states that “stabilization should be effected
at or even a little below the present exchange value of the yen”. See also letter from Lamont to
T. Haraguchi, Japanese Financial Commission, October 4, 1929: “High money rates in New York
and London will, of course affect the movement of funds to and from Japan and the bond
market here. If, therefore, Japan were to decide that, in view of the credit strain and dear money
rates in London and New York and elsewhere, it would be better for her to suffer some
considerable depreciation of the yen and reinflation of domestic prices, that would be an
understandable decision…The Japanese authorities themselves are the only ones who can
form an adequate opinion about political, social and economic conditions in Japan and whether
these are such as to make the moment opportune for stabilization and what the rate of
stabilization should be.”
47 On France, see Mouré 2002.
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Japanese society rather than among the broad mass of the country. Growth not
first rooted in austerity was viewed as not true growth (the metaphor of the
greenhouse or false balance sheet). Meanwhile, the failure of austerity to pro-
duce its advertised results was presented as all the more reason to continue
(there being no other choice, one must try still harder).
Austerity as national policy was particularly problematic in Japan in the
1920s where unemployment was chronic and excess population became an
obsessive concern fuelling immigration to Latin America and the United States
as well as expansion in Manchuria. With Japanese immigration cut off by the
U.S. Congress in 1924, and gold austerity-induced depression at home, the most
appealing option became emigration to Manchuria, which had been a focus of
Japanese businesses, investors, and government entities throughout the 1920s.
When the Minseitô government refused to expand Japanese control in
Manchuria during the 1931 height of Japan’s gold standard depression, Japanese
army units took control themselves. This military rebellion, by troops primarily
from Japan’s most impoverished regions, ushered in establishment of the
Japanese protectorate Manchukuo, and a series of assassinations, attempted
coups, and military governments in Tokyo. The Minseitô government and Inoue
Junnosuke, though, largely ignored the rural poverty that was fuelling military
unrest. Instead, they concentrated on making Japan a subordinate member of an
Anglo-American financial and military order. On the military side was the
Washington Conference System, which set 5:5:3 and 10:10:7 rates for various
types of U.S., British, and Japanese naval vessels. On the economic side was the
gold standard and imitation of 1920s British austerity.
It was only with the fall of the Minseitô government in December 1931 that
austerity was finally abandoned. But if Inoue was particularly stubborn in his
views, he was hardly unique in his obsession with austerity and the self-image
he constructed for himself as the courageous bearer of universal, internationally
sanctioned, scientific truth. In this Inoue was as much a product of his time and
social stratum as Matsukata Masuyoshi in the 1890s had been of his.
Although it is now generally considered standard in English-language lit-
erature to link adherence to the gold standard and the Great Depression this is,
ultimately, a story based on (or supporting) an expansionary, macro, demand-
based reading of economics (with or without the label Keynesian) refracted
through a particular reading of World War II and its causes, and a concern for
certain interests over others.
The Inoue/austerity view reflects its own tradition and interests – a story
that emphasizes inflation rather than deflation, and focuses on the early inter-
war and the 1970s, rather than the late interwar, and supply rather than
demand. One can see both these expansionary and contractionary views in the
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popular, political, and economic arguments and action about present-day aus-
terity and the euro. Which, in turn, contrary to any reading of the gold standard
or the interwar years as historical relics, underlines how interlinked Japan has
been for most of its modern history with institutions and ideas in the rest of the
world, and how little those institutions and ideas – and the interests and
impulses that underlay them – have changed over time, in Japan or elsewhere.
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